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This paper analyses price competition under product di⁄erentiation when goods
are de￿ned in a two dimensional characteristic space, and consumers do not know
which ￿rm sells which quality. Real life economic contexts are often too complex
to be analyzed with the simple toolboxes proposed by textbooks. For example, and
with some signi￿cant exceptions (see Neven and Thisse (1990) and Irmen and Thisse
(1996)), competition with di⁄erentiated products is basically analysed using alter-
natively the two models of horizontal and vertical product di⁄erentiation. These
models describe goods as points in a one-dimensional characteristic space, like the
Hotelling￿ s Main Street paradigm or the Mussa-Rosen￿ s quality ladder. Nonetheless,
real life reveals every day plethoric situations which escape to these abstractions,
simply because competition among ￿rms often develops along more than one dimen-
sion.
Think of restaurants in a town. When consumers are planning to dine out and
compare the merits of two restaurants, they consider the quality of the food, but also
their location and their respective ambiance and surroundings. Similarly, physicians
are not only evaluated with respect to their professional ability, but also with respect
to their empathy with patients. Daily newspapers or weekly magazines attract read-
ers not only by the speci￿city of their content, would it be entertainment or culture,
or a mix of both, but also by their look and the quality of their journalists. When
students have to decide which university to attend (or professors in which university
to work), they generally make a trade o⁄ between the quality of the professors (or
the potential colleagues), and the length of the road connecting the universities to
their own residence. The preferences for clothes and shoes do not depend only on
their aesthetic aspects, which are highly subjective, but also on the intrinsic quality
of the material used in their production. In all these examples, preferences are not
one-dimensional since utility comparisons deal with more than one characteristic:
they re￿ ect the interplay between both horizontal and vertical components. As al-
luded in the title of the Neven and Thisse￿ s paper (see Neven and Thisse (1990)),
these utilities combine the preferences for quality and the preferences for variety.
Food quality, professional ability, journalists￿or professors￿talents, quality of mate-
rial, all these terms used in the above examples refer to the vertical di⁄erentiation
of the goods or services. On the contrary, location, empathy, speci￿city of contents,
aesthetic aspects, refer to their horizontal di⁄erentiation component.
But often, even moving to models embedding multidimensional characteristics,
as Neven and Thisse (1990) do, is not su¢ cient enough to capture various signi￿cant
real life ingredients of product di⁄erentiation. Among these, one of the most impor-
tant is consumers￿uncertainty about quality. Indeed, in several economic contexts,
consumers are unable to assert unequivocally either the qualities of the variants of-
fered in the market, or the ￿rms who sell the high quality brands. Going back to the
above examples, when consumers are planning to dine out and compare the merits
of di⁄erent restaurants, they consider the quality of the food served in each of them,
but most of the time they ignore, or do not know with certainty, which restaurant
2serves the better food. Similarly, the professional ability of physicians is generally
di¢ cult to be unambiguously settled, even if everybody has some idea about their
relative competence. When students have to decide which university to attend, or
professors in which university to work, the outcomes of the trade o⁄are often di¢ cult
to identify, due to the uncertainty about the respective merits of the professors (or
the potential colleagues) in each university. Finally, the preferences for clothes and
shoes are also submitted to uncertainty, due to the existence of fakes and the resulting
di¢ culty of asserting unequivocally the intrinsic quality of the material used in the
production of each brand. When analyzing market competition, imperfect informa-
tion of consumers about product characteristics, and product quality in particular,
is a recurrent problem. Several contributions have been devoted to market behav-
ior under uncertainty (see, e.g. Shapiro (1983), Wolinsky (1986), Ungern-Sternberg
and Weizacker (1985), Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Stahl (1982)). More recently, Gab-
szewicz and Grilo (1992) have studied price competition in a one dimensional model
of vertical product di⁄erentiation, when consumers are uncertain about which ￿rm
sells which quality.
The present paper tends to extend both the contributions by Neven and Thisse
(1990) and by Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992). From the ￿rst, it borrows the idea of
constructing a model which accounts for two-dimensional competition, one related to
a horizontally di⁄erentiated characteristic of the good, and the other to a vertically
di⁄erentiated component. Such a model captures most ingredients of the examples
provided above, but one of them : the consumers￿uncertainty about which ￿rm sells
which quality. From the paper by Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992), the present approach
borrows the idea of relating vertical product di⁄erentiation to uncertainty about the
quality of the goods. But the analysis is now embedded into a bi-dimensional com-
petition, one along the horizontally di⁄erentiated and perfectly observable character-
istic, and the other related to the quality of the product, consumers being uncertain
about which ￿rm sells which quality.
Uncertainty introduces a new element in the picture. Even if everybody knows
that one variant is of a higher quality than the other, it is no longer true that all
consumers now necessarily rank the ￿rms selling these products in the same manner,
as it is the case under vertical di⁄erentiation when quality is perfectly observable.
Population￿ s beliefs about which ￿rm sells which quality can make some consumers
to view one of the ￿rms, say ￿rm 1, as being more than likely the seller of the high
quality variant, while other consumers may well believe the reverse, inverting thereby
their preferences for ￿rm 1 at the advantage of ￿rm 2. Thus, and in contrast with
the Thisse and Neven￿ s construction, the model of this paper not only couples the
two traditional paradigms of product di⁄erentiation, but also captures new situations
in which ￿rms may be di⁄erentiated horizontally in two characteristics, due to the
presence of uncertainty.
This paper can also be viewed as an extension of Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992).
Even if uncertainty is present in both papers concerning the vertical component of
the goods, the addition in the present one of a second horizontally di⁄erentiated
characteristic allows to capture many situations intrinsically represented by two-
3dimensional competition, as in the examples considered above. Thanks to this added
component, consumers may now trade-o⁄ a higher willingness to pay for a variant
against a smaller likelihood that this variant is the high quality one.
The model used in this paper can be succinctly described as follows. As in Thisse
and Neven (1990), we consider that goods are di⁄erentiated along two characteristics,
being vertically di⁄erentiated with respect to the ￿rst, but horizontally di⁄erentiated
with respect to the second: Thus, consumers have di⁄erent evaluations of goods￿mer-
its in relation to the second characteristic while, in a context of perfect information,
consumers should be able to unequivocally and unanimously rank variants in terms
of the ￿rst characteristic. However, we assume that this ￿rst characteristic is not
perfectly observable (in opposition with the second one, which is considered to be
perfectly observable). More precisely, as in Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992), consumers
do not know which ￿rm sells which quality and have heterogeneous beliefs about this
event. We assume that two rival ￿rms sell each one of the variants and behave non
cooperatively when choosing their price strategies.
We focus on interior equilibria, providing su¢ cient conditions for its existence
and uniqueness and showing that the characteristics of the equilibrium are di⁄erent
depending on whether we observe "vertical dominance" or "horizontal dominance".
Furthermore, equilibrium prices consist of two additive terms, which balance con-
sumers￿relative valuation of goods￿expected quality and consumers￿preferences for
variety. However the relative importance of these terms di⁄er under vertical and
horizontal dominance. We end up by comparing the equilibrium under imperfect in-
formation with the prices obtained when all consumers are perfectly informed about
which ￿rm sells which quality. Also, we compare our solutions with the equilibria
corresponding to a fully deterministic vertical di⁄erentiation model with variants￿
qualities de￿ned by the average qualities resulting from the consumers￿beliefs in the
population (certainty equivalent case).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and introduces the
notions of horizontal and vertical dominance. For the two alternative cases, section 3
provides the corresponding price equilibrium analysis. Then, section 4 compares our
results with the benchmarks of perfect information and certainty equivalent cases.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2. The model
We consider two pro￿t maximizing ￿rms (￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2) that produce two
goods (good 1 and good 2); di⁄erentiated along two characteristics. Goods are pro-
duced at a constant marginal cost assumed to be equal to zero, without loss of
generality. With respect to the ￿rst characteristic, products 1 and 2 di⁄er by their
quality. However, as in Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992), consumers are uncertain about
which ￿rm sells which quality and, furthermore, consumers di⁄er in their beliefs
about this uncertain event. The goods are supposed to be di⁄erentiated horizontally
with respect to the second characteristic which is perfectly observable. Thereby, our
4model accounts for two distinct sources of heterogeneity among consumers: (i) con-
sumers formulate di⁄erent subjective probabilities (beliefs) concerning which good
has a higher-quality in terms of the unobservable characteristic; and (ii) they di⁄er
on their evaluation of goods￿merit in relation to the observable characteristic:
Each consumer is identi￿ed by a vector (m;￿): The ￿rst component (m) rep-
resents the subjective probability that consumer of type m assigns to the event:
{product 1 corresponds to the high-quality product}. We assume that m is uniformly
distributed in the interval [m;m]; with
0 ￿ m <
1
2
< m ￿ 1:
We call the interval [m;m] the domain of beliefs. The second component (￿) deals
with the heterogeneity of consumers with respect to the horizontal di⁄erentiation
characteristic, measuring the di⁄erential in utilities consumer ￿ gets when he/she
consumes good 1 versus good 2. We assume that ￿ is uniformly distributed in
[￿min;￿max], with ￿min < 0, representing the consumer who, concerning this characteristic;
prefers the most good 2 to good 1; and ￿max > 0, representing the consumer who
prefers the least good 2 to good 1 regarding this same characteristic:
Hence, consumer (m;￿) can be viewed as a point in the rectangle [m;m] ￿
[￿min;￿max]: When consumer (m;￿) buys good 1; at price p1, she/he expects to
obtain an expected utility EU1 (m;￿;p1) de￿ned by




where V denotes a positive constant1, and uh (resp. ul) is the utility provided by
the variant which corresponds to the high-quality (resp. low-quality) product with
respect to the unobservable characteristic;with uh > ul ￿ 0. When consumer (￿;m)
buys good 2 (instead of good 1), she/he expects to get an expected utility EU2 (m;p2)
de￿ned by




Comparing (1) and (2);it becomes clear that the parameter ￿ indeed represents
the di⁄erential in utilities (with respect to the horizontal di⁄erentiation component)
consumer ￿ gets when she/he consumes good 1 versus good 2 .








= EU2 (m;p2) , (3)
, ~ ￿(m) = (p1 ￿ p2) + (1 ￿ 2m)(uh ￿ ul) (4)
1The constant V is considered to be large enough for all consumers to ￿nd a product for which
their utilities are positive at equilibrium (covered market).
5is indi⁄erent between buying good 1 or good 2:
From expression (4) it follows that, for a given vector of prices (p1;p2); the mar-
ginal consumer ~ ￿(m) evolves linearly and negatively with m :
@~ ￿
@m
= ￿2(￿u) < 0;
with ￿u = uh￿ul: Not surprisingly, for those types of consumers that assign a greater
probability m to the event {product 1 corresponds to the high-quality product}; the
critical value of ~ ￿(m) is lower. Thus, the higher the m￿value; the greater the mass
of consumers ￿ who are willing to buy good 1 instead of good 2.
In order to derive demands as a function of prices, we distinguish between two
cases according to the relative importance of the vertical vsus the horizontal com-
ponent. We say that horizontal (resp. vertical) dominance is observed whenever the
inequality (resp. the reverse inequality)
2￿u(m ￿ m) < ￿max ￿ ￿min (5)
holds2.
According to (4), at a given pair of prices (p1;p2), the set of consumers can be
partitioned into two subsets, each describing those consumers who buy good 1 and
good 2, respectively. For a given value of m 2 [m;m]; the subset of consumers




; while the subset of consumers buying good





The following ￿gures illustrate the structure of demands for di⁄erent pairs of
prices (p1;p2): The ￿rst ￿gure deals with the case of horizontal dominance:
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Horizontal dominance
Each rectangle in the ￿gure above identi￿es a speci￿c partition of the set of
consumers corresponding to di⁄erent pairs of prices (p1;p2): Under horizontal dom-
inance, case 1 corresponds to a value of p1 which, given p2; is so high that there is
no consumer willing to buy variant 1 at that price. In cases 2, 3 and 4, both ￿rms
are active in the market. In case 2, the market share of ￿rm 1 corresponds to the
area of the shadow triangle. When p1 further decreases, we move to case 3, where all
types m are served by both ￿rms and the market share of ￿rm 1 now consists of an
area which is the sum of a triangle and a rectangle. When p1 even further decreases,
we move to case 4 and now demand corresponds to an area which is the sum of a
triangle and two rectangles. Finally, in case 5, ￿rm 1 becomes a monopolist and the
market share of ￿rm 2 is equal to zero.
Under vertical dominance, the same comments apply, mutatis mutandis and the
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Vertical dominance
Addressing the case of horizontal dominance, we de￿ne by RH
i the set RH
i ={(p1;p2) :
(p1;p2) leads to a market share corresponding to case i;i = 1;:::;5}. Similarly, un-
der vertical dominance, we de￿ne by RV
i the set RV
i ={(p1;p2) : (p1;p2) leads to a
market share corresponding to case i;i = 1;:::;5}.
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1 if (p1;p2) 2 RH
5 ;
DH
2 (p1;p2) = 1 ￿ DH
1 (p1;p2);
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(m￿m)(￿max￿￿min)￿u if (p1;p2) 2 RV
4
1 if (p1;p2) 2 RV
5 ;
DV
2 (p1;p2) = 1 ￿ DV
1 (p1;p2);
in the case of vertical dominance. The exact de￿nition of the domains RH
i and RV
i
is provided in appendix A.
It is easily seen that, in both cases, demands are continuous and decreasing in
￿rms￿own prices. However, demands are not everywhere concave functions. Namely,
the demand of ￿rm 1 is convex in (p1;p2) 2 R
j
2;j = H;V (under both horizontal or




Considering the characteristics of demand, we introduce hereafter su¢ cient condi-
tions guaranteeing that, in each of these domains (where demands are locally convex),
for a given rival￿ s price, individual pro￿ts are decreasing in ￿rms￿own prices. Thus,
these conditions are su¢ cient to prevent the occurrence of unilateral advantageous
deviations leading a pair of prices to fall in these convex domains. This is su¢ cient
to guarantee that any price equilibrium, if it exists, should be in RH
3 ; in the case of
horizontal dominance; and in RV
3 ; in the case of vertical dominance.
The following lemmata identify su¢ cient conditions for this to occur.
Lemma 1. Horizontal dominance
Under the case of horizontal dominance, pro￿ts of ￿rm 1 are decreasing in p1 when
(p1;p2) 2 RH
2 if
￿max ￿ (1 + m ￿ 3m)￿u (6)
Similarly pro￿ts of ￿rm 2 are decreasing in p2 when (p1;p2) 2 RH
4 if
￿￿min ￿ (3m ￿ m ￿ 1)￿u (7)
Proof. In appendix.



















For (p1;p2) 2 R
j
1;j = H;V; the demand for good 1 is linear and, consequently, locally concave.










;j = H;V: and locally
concave for (p1;p2) 2 R
j
5;j = H;V:
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In the following section we characterize equilibrium prices. Firstly, in subsection
3.1 we analyze equilibrium prices when the conditions in lemma 1 hold (horizontal
dominance setting). Then, in subsection 3.2, we restrict our analysis to the values of
the parameters accomplishing the conditions in lemma 2 (vertical dominance setting).
3. Equilibrium analysis
3.1. Horizontal dominance
When lemma 1 holds, ￿rms￿pro￿ts are quasi-concave functions of prices and they
reach only one maximum value in region RH


















Accordingly, the unique price equilibrium obtains as the interior solution of the




























which are both positive as long as the conditions provided in lemma 1 are met. As
a consequence, we obtain the following
Proposition 1. Under horizontal dominance (lemma 1):
(i) given ￿min and ￿max; ￿rms￿equilibrium prices are determined by the average beliefs
10m+m






2), ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2) charges a positive "quality premium" to consumers,
while the rival ￿rm o⁄ers a "quality discount";
(ii) given the domain of beliefs [m;m] and the dispersion of preferences ￿max ￿￿min;
the larger ￿max (resp. the smaller ￿min); the larger the preferences￿ bias towards
variant 1 (resp. variant 2); and the higher the "variety premium" charged by ￿rm 1
(resp. ￿rm 2) to the consumers.
According to proposition 1, the di⁄erence between equilibrium prices depends on
two components. The ￿rst derives from consumers￿heterogeneity concerning the hor-
izontal component (￿min;￿max) and the second derives from consumers￿heterogeneity
in terms of their beliefs (m;m) and the quality di⁄erential between the variants (￿u):
In order to get a better insight on ￿rms￿price behaviour under horizontal dom-
inance, it is convenient to consider the particular case when the domain of beliefs
is centered around m = 1
2 (symmetric beliefs): In this case, the price equilibrium
presents some speci￿c properties: regardless of the dispersion of beliefs, m + m is
always equal to 1 and the beliefs of the average consumer are now given by m = 1
2:
Hence, following from proposition 1; only the heterogeneity of consumers concerning
the horizontal component determines equilibrium prices. In fact, under a symmetric
distribution of beliefs around m = 1
2; a positive (resp. negative) variation in the
di⁄erential ￿u a⁄ects the locus ~ ￿(m) in the following way. It increases (resp. de-
creases) ~ ￿(m) for consumers of type m < 1
2 but it decreases (resp. increases) ~ ￿(m)
for the remaining consumers (whose beliefs correspond to m > 1
2). Thus, a positive
(resp. negative) variation in the di⁄erential ￿u entails two e⁄ects of opposite sign
on ￿rms￿demands5. It turns out that, when beliefs are symmetric and the conditions
imposed by lemma 1 are met, these e⁄ects are perfectly symmetric and, consequently,
￿rms￿demand do not depend on consumers￿valuation of goods in terms of quality
(i.e. the quantity demanded of each good is independent of the dispersion of beliefs
m ￿ m and the quality di⁄erential ￿u).
The following ￿gure graphically illustrates this argument:
5On the one hand, this variation leads to an increase (resp decrease) of the demand for good 2
among those consumers who trust more in good 2 (or equivalently, among those consumers whose
beliefs are represented by m < 1
2): On the other hand, this variation leads to a decrease (resp
increase) of the demand for good 2 among those consumers who trust more in good 1 (i.e. those
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Thus, as long as the di⁄erential in goods￿quality is not too large (i.e. lemma 1 is
met), when consumers￿beliefs are centered around m = 1
2; equilibrium prices do not
depend on goods￿qualities and the high-quality ￿rm is not able to charge a quality
premium. This is no longer the case when beliefs are not perfectly symmetric. In
that case, for a given [￿min;￿max]; the more consumers trust a certain good; the larger
the quality premium charged by the trusted ￿rm and the larger the quality discount
charged by the less-trusted ￿rm.
3.2. Vertical dominance
When lemma 2 holds, ￿rms￿pro￿ts are quasi-concave functions of prices and they
reach only one maximum value in region RV









































12which are both positive, under the conditions pointed out in lemma 2:
Proposition 2. Under vertical dominance (lemma 2) :
(i) given the domain of beliefs [m;m]; ￿rms￿equilibrium prices are determined by the





: when preferences for variety are biased towards good 1 (resp. good
2); with ￿max > ￿￿min (resp. ￿max < ￿ ￿min), ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2) charges a positive
"variety premium" to consumers, while the rival ￿rm sets a "variety discount".
(ii) given [￿min;￿max] and (m ￿ m); the larger m (resp. the smaller m); the greater
the trustworthiness of good 1 (resp. good 2), and the larger the "quality premium"
charged by ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2):
As before, in the case of vertical dominance, the magnitude of the di⁄erence be-
tween the equilibrium prices depends on two components: the horizontal component
(￿min;￿max) and the vertical component (which is determined by the quality gap, ￿u,
and the degree of uncertainty concerning products￿characteristics(m;m)).
However, it is worthy to notice that, di⁄erently from before, even when consumers￿
beliefs are centered around m = 1
2; ￿rms￿demands are no longer independent of
the quality gap and, accordingly, even under a symmetric distribution of beliefs
(m + m = 1), the quality gap in￿ uences ￿rms￿equilibrium prices. The larger the
quality gap, the more expansive both goods become:
pV ￿
1 = (m ￿ m)￿u + ￿max+￿min
6 ;
pV ￿
2 = (m ￿ m)￿u ￿ ￿max+￿min
6 :
(10)
When beliefs are symmetric, both goods can be seen as evenly trusted within the
population of consumers. Consequently, in a scenario of imperfect information, the
low-quality ￿rm takes advantage of uncertainty to charge a quality premium, which
coincides with the quality premium charged by the truly high-quality product.
When consumers￿beliefs are not symmetric; ceteris paribus the larger the trust-
worthiness of good i, the greater the quality premium charged by the trusted good as
well as the quality discount o⁄ered by the less-trusted good. Goods￿trustworthiness
is determined by the interval of beliefs: trustworthiness in good 1 (resp. good 2) pos-
itively (negatively) depends on m and m (for a given value of m or m; respectively):
To sum up, when goods are de￿ned in a two dimensional characteristic space, and
consumers do not know which ￿rm sells which quality, equilibrium prices consist of
two additive terms, which balance consumers￿relative valuation of goods￿expected
quality and consumers￿preferences for variety. However the relative importance of
these terms di⁄er under vertical and horizontal dominance.
Furthermore, assuming beliefs are symmetric around m = 1
2; we have shown that,
under horizontal dominance, the relative valuation of goods￿expected quality plays
no role at equilibrium. On the contrary, under vertical dominance, equilibrium prices
depend on this valuation. Nevertheless, in the last case, given the symmetry of beliefs,
13both ￿rms charge the same quality premium, independently of their true quality.
If, instead, the symmetry lies in the preferences for the horizontally di⁄erentiated
characteristic (￿￿min = ￿max); under vertical dominance, equilibrium prices do not
depend on consumers￿preferences for variety. When consumers￿preferences towards
the horizontal dimension are asymmetric, (￿max 6= ￿￿min); ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2)
charges a "variety premium" whenever ￿max > ￿￿min (resp. ￿max < ￿￿min):
Comparing our results with Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992); we observe that the
equilibrium prices in the latter coincide with ours when we "neutralize" the het-
erogeneity of consumers￿preferences with respect to variety (￿max = ￿￿min = 0): In
that case, we are necessarily in the vertical dominance setting. When ￿max > ￿￿min
(resp. ￿max < ￿￿min), the equilibrium price of ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2) exceeds the cor-
responding equilibrium price of this ￿rm in Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992); while the
other ￿rm charges a lower price in our setting. In the case of horizontal dominance,
"neutralizing" the heterogeneity of consumers￿preferences with respect to variety
(￿max = ￿￿min = 0) necessarily requires ￿u to be equal to zero6. In that case, both
￿rms quote prices equal to zero at equilibrium: since there is no more any source of
di⁄erentiation between goods, we end up with pure competition "￿ la Bertrand".
4. Perfect information
In this section, we assume that quality is perfectly observable and, without loss of
generality, good 1 is the high-quality good. Then m = m = 1 and the only source of
heterogeneity among consumers comes from the horizontal di⁄erentiation component
(￿).





0 if p1 ￿ p2 ￿ ￿max + ￿u
￿max￿(p1￿p2￿￿u)
￿max￿￿min if ￿min + ￿u < p1 ￿ p2 < ￿max + ￿u
1 if p1 ￿ p2 ￿ ￿min + ￿u
(11)
and
D2 (p1;p2) = 1 ￿ D1 (p1;p2) (12)
It is easily seen that ￿rms￿demands are continuous, decreasing and concave functions
of ￿rms￿own prices. Firms￿best reply functions are then given by7:
p1 (p2) =
￿ 1
2 (￿max + p2 + ￿u) if 0 ￿ p2 < (￿max ￿ 2￿min ￿ ￿u)
p2 + ￿min + ￿u if p2 ￿ (￿max ￿ 2￿min ￿ ￿u) ;
6This corresponds to a degenerate case of lemma 1: When ￿max = ￿￿min = 0; given that
m < 1
2 < m; the conditions in lemma 1 are only valid for ￿u = 0.
7We do not consider price policies leading to the eviction of ￿rm 2; since these would require
p2 < ￿￿1 ￿ ￿u; which is inconsistent with the non-negativity constraint.





p1 ￿ ￿max ￿ ￿u if p1 ￿ 2￿max ￿ ￿min + ￿u
￿1
2 (￿min ￿ p1 + ￿u) if ￿min + ￿u < p1 < 2￿max ￿ ￿min + ￿u
p1 ￿ ￿min ￿ ￿u if p1 ￿ ￿min + ￿u
;
in the case of ￿rm 2:
Thus, in a scenario of perfect information, equilibrium prices with both ￿rms
active in the market obtain as:
pPI￿
1 = 1
3 (2￿max ￿ ￿min + ￿u);
pPI￿
2 = 1
3 (￿max ￿ 2￿min ￿ ￿u);
which occurs as long as:
￿max ￿ 2￿min ￿ ￿u:
Proposition 3. Under perfect information, when the conditions of lemma 1
(horizontal dominance) hold, both ￿rms are active at equilibrium. Furthermore, equi-
librium prices coincide with those obtained for imperfect information when the domain
of beliefs is degenerate and reduces to the singleton m = 1:
Accordingly, the introduction of a "perfect label" leads to an increase in the price
of the high quality good and a concomitant decrease of the price of the low-quality
one.8
Proposition 4. Under perfect information, when the conditions of lemma 2
(vertical dominance) hold, both ￿rms are active at equilibrium if and only if:
￿max ￿ 2￿min ￿ ￿u:
Otherwise only the ￿rm selling the high-quality good is active in the market.
Indeed, in the case of vertical dominance9 as stated in lemma 2, an interior
solution can only arise if consumers￿preferences with respect to the horizontal char-
acteristic are biased towards good 2, i.e. ￿max ￿ 2￿min > ￿u. If this condition is
not satis￿ed, the equilibrium price of good 2 would be negative. Therefore, there is
only space for the high-quality good in this industry. At equilibrium, the monopolist
(￿rm 1) would charge a price p￿PI
1 equal to
p￿PI
1 = ￿min + ￿u;
which prevents entry of ￿rm 2 even when p￿PI
2 = 0 (limit price).
Accordingly, there are situations in which the low quality ￿rm can survive only
due to consumers￿imperfect information. Informing consumers would lead to the
exclusion of the low quality ￿rm, thus entailing a more concentrated equilibrium
8See Bonroy and Constantatos (2008) on the e⁄ects of perfect labels on equilibrium.
9In the case of perfect information (m= m = 1), the vertical dominance as stated in lemma 2
establishes that vertical di⁄erentiation must be su¢ ciently strong: ￿u >
￿max￿3￿min
2 :
15market structure. In spite of this, the loss of pro￿ts by the low quality ￿rm is more
than compensated by the welfare improvement for the other agents.
Another benchmark to compare our solutions would consist in comparing the
equilibria obtained in our analysis with the one corresponding to a fully deterministic





















This corresponds to replace the uncertainty bearing on the identity of the ￿rms by
the certainty equivalent obtained by the average consumer, say consumer ^ m; whose
beliefs coincide with the average belief10 ^ m =
m+m
2 :
Notice that, by focusing on consumer ^ m, we neutralize consumers￿dispersion of
beliefs since all consumers are now assumed to have the same beliefs as consumer ^ m:
Consequently, as in the case of perfect information, we end up with a pure horizon-
tal di⁄erentiation model, with consumers￿heterogeneity bearing exclusively on the




3 (2￿max ￿ ￿min + (2^ m ￿ 1)￿u);
pCE￿
2 = 1
3 (￿max ￿ 2￿min ￿ (2^ m ￿ 1)(￿u));
which coincide with the prices obtained under horizontal dominance with beliefs
uniformly distributed on the interval [m;m]; i.e., under imperfect information with
horizontal dominance (see (8)).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered price competition when variants are de￿ned
along two dimensions (horizontal and vertical) and consumers are uncertain about
which ￿rm sells which quality.
Despite the complexity of this problem, we have succeeded in identifying suf-
￿cient conditions for existence and uniqueness. These conditions correspond to a
wide domain of the parameters, bearing on consumers￿heterogeneity both with re-
spect to their preferences for variety and with respect to their beliefs. This domain
comprises two distinct sub-domains, corresponding, respectively, to horizontal and
vertical dominance. The ￿rst (resp. second) domain is relevant when the quality gap
is su¢ ciently small (resp. large) in comparison with the dispersion of consumers￿
preferences for variety.
Under these conditions, we were able to explicitly derive the equilibrium values
for prices, showing that these equilibrium prices di⁄er under vertical versus horizon-
tal dominance. In both cases, equilibrium prices consist of two additive terms, which
10In particular, when ^ m = 1; the case of certainty equivalent coincides with the case of perfect
information when good 1 is the high-quality good.
16balance consumers￿relative valuation of goods￿expected quality and consumers￿pref-
erences for variety. The relative importance of each terms will be di⁄erent depending
on whether we have horizontal or vertical dominance.
We have compared our results with a perfect information setting. We concluded
that perfect information, by eliminating the dispersion of consumers￿beliefs engen-
ders a pure horizontally di⁄erentiated model. Furthermore, when the quality di⁄er-
ential is su¢ ciently large and consumers are perfectly informed about it, we have
shown that informing consumers would lead to the exclusion of the low quality ￿rm
(which would survive in a setting of imperfect information).
Finally, we have considered the certainty equivalent outcome, in which the dis-
persion of consumers￿beliefs is eliminated and replaced by the beliefs of the average
consumer. In this benchmark case, equilibrium prices coincide with those obtained
under horizontal dominance in a setting of imperfect information. Moreover, when
the average consumer is perfectly informed, the equilibrium prices corresponding to
the certainty equivalent outcome coincide with those obtained under perfect infor-
mation.
17Appendix
Appendix A - Demand regions
A.1) Demand regions under horizontal dominance
Let us denote uh ￿ ul by ￿u.
Under horizontal dominance, we have de￿ned by RH
i the set RH
i ={(p1;p2) :
(p1;p2) leads to a market share corresponding to case i;i = 1;:::;5}. Observing ￿gure
1, it becomes evident that RH
I is observed whenever ￿(m) > ￿max; or equivalently:
RH
1 = f(p1;p2) : p1 ￿ p2 ￿ ￿max + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug:
From ￿gure 1; it follows as well that RH
2 is observed whenever: ￿(m) > ￿max
and, simultaneously ￿min < ￿(m) < ￿max: Under horizontal dominance (condition
(5) holds), these conditions imply:
RH
2 = f(p1;p2) : (2m ￿ 1)￿u + ￿max ￿ p1 ￿ p2 < ￿max + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug:
Similarly, RH
3 is observed when ￿(m) > ￿min and ￿(m) < ￿max; which, under
horizontal dominance are equivalent to:
RH
3 = f(p1;p2) : ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)￿u ￿ p1 ￿ p2 < ￿max + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug:
RH
4 is observed when ￿min < ￿(m) < ￿max and, simultaneously, ￿(m) < ￿min:
This is equivalent to
RH
4 = f(p1;p2) : ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)￿u ￿ p1 ￿ p2 < ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug:
Finally, under RH
5 ￿rm 1 is a monopolist, which is observed whenever ￿(m) <
￿min; or equivalently:
RH
5 = f(p1;p2) : p1 ￿ p2 < ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug:
A.2) Demand regions under vertical dominance
Under vertical dominance, the same comments apply, mutatis mutandis and, in
this case, demand regions are given by:
RV
1 = f(p1;p2) : p1 ￿ p2 ￿ ￿max + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug;
RV
2 = f(p1;p2) : ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)￿u ￿ p1 ￿ p2 < ￿max + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug;
RV
3 = f(p1;p2) : ￿max + (2m ￿ 1)￿u ￿ p1 ￿ p2 < ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug;
RV
4 = f(p1;p2) : ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)￿u ￿ p1 ￿ p2 < ￿max + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug;
RV
5 = f(p1;p2) : p1 ￿ p2 < ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)￿ug:
18Appendix B - Proofs
B.1) Proof of Lemma 1
In (p1;p2) 2 RH






(￿max ￿ p1 + p2 + (2m ￿ 1)(￿u))
2














The extremes of ￿1 (p1;p2)eRH






@p1 = 0; yielding:
^ p1 (p2) = ￿max + p2 + (2m ￿ 1)(￿u) (13)
￿ p1 (p2) =
1
3
(￿max + p2 + (2m ￿ 1)(￿u)) (14)
Notice that, for a given p2; the price level ^ p1 (p2) corresponds to the switching
price between RH
2 and RH
I (where ￿rm 1 is evicted from the market, obtaining nil
pro￿ts). Accordingly, ￿rm 1 will never have any incentives to make an unilateral
deviation towards ^ p1 (p2):












￿ p1(p2) > 0: (16)
Accordingly, if ￿ p1 (p2) occurs for (p1;p2) : ￿ p1 (p2) ￿ p2 < (2m ￿ 1)(￿u) + ￿max;
we observe that ￿ p1 (p2) would be outside (at the left) of RH
2 . Thus, considering
(13)-(16), for any (p1;p2) 2 RH
2 ; we observe that
@￿1(p1;p2)eRH
2
@p1 < 0; preventing any
incentives for advantageous unilateral deviations by ￿rm 1: To end the proof, plug
(14) in the condition
￿ p1 (p2) ￿ p2 < (2m ￿ 1)(￿u) + ￿max; (17)
obtaining:
p2 > ￿(￿max + (3m ￿ m ￿ 1)(￿u)) (18)
Given that prices must be non-negative, a su¢ cient condition to guarantee that
(18) holds is:
￿(￿max + (3m ￿ m ￿ 1)(￿u)) ￿ 0 ,
, ￿max ￿ (1 + m ￿ 3m)(￿u);
19which corresponds to condition (6) in Lemma 1.
Concerning the second condition in lemma 2, one must analyze pro￿ts of ￿rm 2
under the case of horizontal dominance. In (p1;p2) 2 RH
4 ; ￿rm 20s pro￿ts are given






(￿min ￿ p1 + p2 ￿ (1 ￿ 2m)(￿u))
2














The extremes of ￿2 (p1;p2)eRH






@p2 = 0; yielding:
^ p2 (p1) = ￿￿min + p1 ￿ (2m ￿ 1)(￿u) (19)
￿ p2 (p1) =
1
3
(￿￿min + p1 ￿ (2m ￿ 1)(￿u)) (20)
Notice that, for a given p1; the price level ^ p2 (p1) corresponds to the switching
price between RH
4 and RH
5 (where ￿rm 2 is evicted from the market, obtaining nil
pro￿ts). Accordingly, ￿rm 2 will never have incentives to make an unilateral deviation
towards ^ p2 (p1):












￿ p2(p1) < 0: (22)
Accordingly, if ￿ p2 (p1) occurs for (p1;p2) : p1 ￿ ￿ p2 (p1) > ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)(￿u);
we observe that ￿ p2 (p1) would be outside (at the left) of RH
4 . Thus, considering
(21)-(22), for any (p1;p2) 2 RH
4 ; we observe that
@￿2(p1;p2)eRH
4
@p2 < 0; preventing any
incentives for advantageous unilateral deviations by ￿rm 1: To end the proof, plug
(20) in the condition
p1 ￿ ￿ p2 (p1) > ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)(￿u); (23)
obtaining
p1 > ￿min ￿ (m ￿ 3m + 1)(￿u) (24)
Given that prices must be non-negative, a su¢ cient condition to guarantee that
the previous condition holds is:
￿min ￿ (m ￿ 3m + 1)(￿u) ￿ 0 ,
, ￿￿min ￿ (3m ￿ 1 ￿ m)(￿u);
20which corresponds to condition (7) in Lemma 1.￿
B.2) Proof of Lemma 2
Notice that all the comments concerning the pro￿ts of ￿rm 1 up to expression
(16) in the proof of lemma 1 also hold in the case of vertical dominance. However,
considering the price domains, in the case of vertical dominance, condition (17)
becomes
￿ p1 (p2) ￿ p2 < ￿min + (2m ￿ 1)(￿u);




(￿max ￿ 3￿min ￿ 2(2m ￿ 1)(￿u)):
Given non-negativity of prices a su¢ cient condition to guarantee that the above
inequality holds for all feasible p2 is:
1
2





which corresponds to the ￿rst condition in lemma 2.
Similarly, all the comments concerning the pro￿ts of ￿rm 2 until expression (22)
also hold in the case of vertical dominance. However, considering the price domains,
in the case of vertical dominance, condition (23) becomes
p1 ￿ ￿ p2 (p1) > ￿max + (2m ￿ 1)(￿u);




(3￿max ￿ ￿min + 2(2m ￿ 1)(￿u)):
Given non-negativity of prices a su¢ cient condition to guarantee that the above
inequality holds for all feasible p2 is:
1
2





which corresponds to the second condition in lemma 2.￿
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